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COMMENTS
CAPACITY, PARENTAL POWER, AND A MINOR'S
RIGHT TO REMAIN MARRIED
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Legislative Control Over Marriages
Subject to constitutional limitations, it is totally within
the power of the legislature to determine the age at which a
person may marry.' This is but one aspect of the state's ap-
propriation of the right to regulate virtually every aspect of
the institution of marriage.'
Under California Civil Code Section 4101,' a minor is in-
capable of consenting to and consummating a valid marriage
without the consent of one parent or guardian. If the minor
C 1982 by Susan E. Atchison
1. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); McClure v. Donovan, 33 Cal. 2d
717, 728, 205 P.2d 17, 24 (1949). Cf. Dribin v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 345, 351, 231
P.2d 809, 813 (1951) (subject to constitutional limits, legislature's power in divorce is
paramount). This power is justified as an exercise of the police power which confers
upon the states the ability to enact laws in order to protect the safety, health, morals
and general welfare of society. See In re Quinn, 35 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 881, 890 (1973).
2. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. at 205; In re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal. App.
3d 108, 112, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1972).
3. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4101 (West Supp. 1980) (amended by 1979 Cal. Stats. ch.
621, § 2, operative Jan. 1, 1980).
4. Section 4101 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any unmarried male of the age of eighteen years or upwards, and
any unmarried female of the age of eighteen years or upwards, and not
otherwise disqualified, are capable of consenting to and consummating
marriage. (b) Any unmarried male or female under the age of eighteen
years is capable of consenting to and consummating marriage if each of
the following documents is filed with the clerk issuing the marriage li-
cense as provided in Section 4201: (1) The consent in writing of the par-
ents of each person who is underage, or of one of the parents or the
guardian of each such person; (2) After such showing as the Superior
Court may require, an order of such Court granting permidsion to such
underage person to marry.
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succeeds in contracting marriage without the required con-
sent, the marriage is voidable and may be adjudged a nullity."
Under general principles, a marriage is voidable only at
the insistance of the party under disability. Under California
law, however, such a proceeding may be commenced "by a
parent, guardian, conservator, or other person having charge
of such nonaged male or female. . . ." It has been held that
this power exists as a separate and independent right in the
parent which may be exercised even contrary to the wishes of
the nonaged child and spouse.'
B. Judicial Discretion
Parental rights regarding the ability to commence nullifi-
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4425 (West 1970) (This section was added by 1969 Cal.
Stats. ch. 1608, § 8 to replace former CAL. CIv. CODE § 82; Section 4425 provides that
a marriage is voidable and may be adjudged a nullity if: "(a) The party who com-
mences the proceeding or on whose behalf the proceeding is commenced was without
the capability of consenting thereto as provided in 4101, unless, after attaining the
age of consent, such party for any time freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife .... " CAL. CIV. CODE §4425 (West 1970).
6. See In re Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41,100 P. 159 (1909); accord, Sawyer v. Slack,
196 N.C. 697, 146 S.E. 864 (1929) (though minor married without parental consent,
mother cannot maintain action for annulment); Niland v. Niland, 96 N.J. Eq. 438,
126 A. 530 (1924) (third parties lack standing to annul a marriage, the right to di-
vorce or annulment belongs exculsively to the spouses.) Ex parte Nolte, 269 S.W. 906,
907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (marriage of a female under the age of 18 is voidable at the
insistance of the underage female, not at the insistance of relatives or even parents).
7. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4426 (West Supp. 1980) (amended by Stats. 1979, ch. 730 §
11, operative Jan. 1, 1981) provides:
A proceeding to obtain a judgment of nullity of marriage, for causes set
forth in Section 4425, must be commenced within the periods and by
the parties, as follows: (a) For causes mentioned in subdivision (a): by
the party to the marriage who was married under the age of legal con-
sent, within four years after arriving at the age of consent, or by a par-
ent, guardian, conservator, or other person having charge of such
nonaged male or female, at any time before such married minor has ar-
rived at the age of legal consent.
8. Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d 636, 334 P.2d 1011 (1959) (decided under
former CAL. CIv. CODE § 82); Vaughan v. Gideon, 56 Cal. App. 2d 158, 132 P.2d 529
(1942) (decided under former CAL. CIv. CODE § 82). In both cases the court held that
a parent has a separate and distinct right to annul a minor child's marriage. Accord-
ing to Vaughan this right is not foreclosed by the fact that the minor has misrepre-
sented his or her age, and according to Turner, the right is preserved even in cases
where the parent has consented if that consent was induced by the child's misrepre-
sentation. One California case, Greene v. Williams, 9 Cal. App. 3d 559, 88 Cal. Rptr.
261 (1970) held that a parent does not have an independent property right in having
a minor child's marriage annuled. The case is distinguished, however, in that the mi-
nor spouse was deceased and the marriage was therefore already dissolved.
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cation proceedings on behalf of a minor child may be seen as a
protective device. In the case of a very young or very imma-
ture child who is unable to foresee the consequences of an ill-
advised marriage, such a device is not only warranted, it is
necessary. Young persons are extremely susceptible to influ-
ence and the possibilities for exploitation and abuse are pat-
ent. Even the danger which inheres in a superficial realization
of what marriage involves is sufficient to justify a mechanism
providing for decision-making beyond the control of the
minor.
Under the present California system, however, even a mi-
nor perfectly capable of understanding and assuming the re-
sponsibilities of marriage9 is subject to the decision of a third
party. An analysis of the cases dealing with minor marriages
indicates that the parent or guardian of a particular minor
spouse has the sole ability to determine the minor's capacity
to sustain a marital relationship. No provision is made for in-
dividual determinations. It appears that judicial discretion
ceases once it is determined that the individual was under
eighteen at the time the marriage took place and that parental
consent was not obtained. Judicial obligation in such cases is
apparently perceived as no more than the duty to effectuate
parental demands.' 0
Nonage does not of itself constitute an absolute right in
the designated third parties to have the marriage nullified.
Under many statutes, it has been within the discretion of the
court to grant or deny the petition."
9. Several factors are involved when a minor decides to marry: property rights
may be drastically effected; minor spouses may be incapable of caring for their own
children; heavy burdens may result in terms of finances and emotional stability.
10. See Vaughan v. Gideon, 56 Cal. App. 2d 158, 132 P.2d 529 (1942); Ruiz v.
Ruiz, 6 Cal. App. 3d 58, 85 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1970) (decided under former CAL. Civ.
CODE § 82). The Vaughan court declared that: "The right to commence and maintain
such an action would seem to carry with it a right to the relief thus provided for
where the complaint is sufficient and the necessary facts are established without con-
flict." 56 Cal. App. 2d at 161, 132 P.2d 531. The court expressly stated that there is
little room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court. Id. Ruiz consid-
ered the scope of judicial discretion in light of the word "may" found in former CAL.
CIV. CODE § 82. The court concluded that use of the word "may" does not render the
annulment decision wholly discretionary in view of the state policy restricting the
marriages of minors. 6 Cal. App. 3d at 60, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
For a further discussion of judicial discretion in proceedings to nullify minor
marriages, see Note Dissolution and Voidable Marriage Under the California Family
Law Act, 4 Lov L.A.L. REV. 331, 346-47 (1971).
11. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 219 Ark. 69, 239 S.W.2d 748 (1951).
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The California view of limited judicial discretion is con-
trary to the recent realization on the part of the legal system
that minors are persons who possess constitutional rights.12 It
fails to accord the constitutional protections mandated in
light of the fundamental right to marry, and it perpetuates
the outdated notion that children are the property of their
parents, subject to every arbitrary or capricious parental
command.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
A. Marriage as a Fundamental Right
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it
clear that "the right to marry is of fundamental impor-
tance." This determination that marriage is a fundamental
right is the result of a long line of cases which have recognized
the particularly personal quality in matters surrounding mar-
riage and family life."
In Zablocki v. Redhail,1 ' the Court was asked to consider
the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute prohibiting per-
sons from marrying in any case where support obligations had
not been met with respect to children not in such persons'
custody. It was held that critical examination of the state in-
terest advanced is required whenever a classification signifi-
cantly interferes with the exercise of the fundamental right to
marry.16
Zablocki was decided on the basis of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 7 Constitutional
12. "Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights." Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 74 (1975). Yet the states' interest in protecting a young person from harm justifies
certain restraints and protective measures that would not be constitutionally permis-
sible in the case of an adult. Id. at 102 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
14. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (Consti-
tution protects the privacy and integrity of the family). Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (observed the long-standing recognition of per-
sonal choice in matters of marriage and family life) Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (freedom to marry is an essential personal right); Prince v. Massachusetts, 121
U.S. 158 (1944) (recognized "the private realm of family life").
15. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
16. Id. at 383.
17. Id.
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protection afforded persons in the exercise of marital rights,
however, has not been limited to this clause. In Loving v. Vir-
ginia,18 the Court found that a law prohibiting marriage be-
tween interracial couples constituted a violation of due pro-
cess, 19 and in Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur,2' the
Court held that personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life are liberties protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause.
In a concurring opinion by Justice Stewart in Zablocki,
the unconstitutionality of the Wisconsin statute was attrib-
uted to a violation of the due process clause. The equal pro-
tection argument taken by the majority was explicitly rejected
in Justice Stewart's assertion that "the problem in this case is
not one of discriminatory classifications, but of encroachments
upon a constitutionally protected freedom.""' A concurring
opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Stone in Skinner v. Oklahoma"
also explicitly rejected equal protection as a basis for holding
a compulsory sterilization law unconstitutional. 23 In his con-
currence, the Chief Justice asserted that the real concern was'
whether "the wholesale condemnation of a class to such an
invasion of personal liberty without the opportunity for any
individual to show that his is not the type of case which would
justify resort to it, satisfies the demands of due process.","
These views are significant in light of the well-established
rule that the law may subject minors to more stringent limita-
tions than are permissible with respect to adults.' Classifica-
tions based upon valid distinctions are not unconstitutional."
18. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
19. In Loving the Court recognized that a law prohibiting marriage to an inter-
racial couple deprived them of equal protection. The Court went on, however, to hold
that freedom to marry is protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 12.
20. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
21. 434 U.S. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
22. 316 U.S. 535, 543-45 (1941) (Stone, J. concurring).
23. Id. at 544. Skinner involved the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act which authorized the sterilization of persons convicted two
or more times of a crime amounting to a felony involving moral turpitude. The law
was found to be unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
26. "[D]isparities among classes are constitutionally permissible when reasona-
bly related to proper purpose." In re Mitchell P., 22 Cal. 3d 946, 950, 587 P.2d 1144,
1147, 151 Cal. Rptr. 330, 334 (1978).
19821
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Therefore, an equal protection argument offers less support to
the minor's right to remain married than does a due process
argument.2
7
Children have always been recognized as proper subjects
for distinctive legislation in light of the state's independent
interest in protecting them and because children are seen as
lacking full capacity for individual choice.28 It follows then,
that although minors may be treated differently as a class,
due process has never been restricted to the protection of
adult rights.29 Regardless of the precise source from which the
minor's rights derive, it has been held that "neither the four-
teenth amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."30 In light of the fundamental nature of the marital de-
cision and the fact that children are protected by the constitu-
tion, a logical analysis leads to the conclusion that the "criti-
cal examination" required by Zablocki1 is applicable to a law
subjecting the marital decisions of minors to the control of
third parties.
B. Extending Constitutional Protection to Minors
Beginning with the juvenile court movement at the end of
the last century, minors in conflict with the law have been de-
nied legal procedural rights in exchange for the state's "care
27. There has been some argument in favor of extending equal protection to
minors in the area of juvenile justice. According to Mr. Justice Black in his concur-
ring opinion in In re Gault:
Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged and
convicted . . . the Constitution requires that he be tried in accordance
with the guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights made ap-
plicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendmcnt. . . . [I]t would be
a plain denial of equal protection of the law-an invidious discrimina-
tion-to hold that others subject to heavier punishment could, because
they are children, be denied these same constitutional safeguards.
387 U.S. 1, 61 (1967) (Black, J., concurring).
28. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-40 (1968). "The State's inter-
est in protecting a young person from harm justifies the imposition of restraints on
his or her freedom even though comparable restraints on adults would be constitu-
tionally impossible." Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102 (1975).
29. In his concurring opinion in Danforth, Mr. Justice Stevens asserts that, al-
though the abortion decision is entitled to constitutional protection, this does not
lead to the conclusion that the legislature has no power to enact legislation for the
protection of young persons, but rather emphasizes the importance of the decision to
abort. 428 U.S. at 90-91.
30. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
31. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16; Note, The Constitutionality of
Parental Consent Requirements in Minor Marriages, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 301 (1979).
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and solicitude." Children were to be treated and rehabilitated
rather than punished when they fell outside of the law or
when they showed signs of moving in that direction. When
children were brought into court the proceedings were charac-
terized as "non-adversarial" and designated "civil" rather
than "criminal". As a result, the proceedings were not subject
to the requirements which usually restrict the state when it
seeks to deprive a person of liberty. 2
In Re Gault,83 decided in 1967, overturned decades of
precedent in affording procedural due process rights tojuveniles in delinquency proceedings which might result in
commitment to an institution. The Court simply concluded
that departures from established principles of due process fre-
quently resulted, not in enlightened procedure, but in arbi-
trariness. 4 Gault is now viewed as the touchstone of juvenile
rights. Subsequent cases have merely expanded the Gault
logic. The result has been a growing realization within the le-
gal system that, when children are to be treated in a manner
different from adults, some philosophy must exist which justi-
fies the different treatment.3 5
In 1976, the Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth,6 considered the constitutionality of a Missouri
statute that required every unmarried woman under the age
of eighteen to procure the written consent of a parent before
seeking an abortion.3 7 The Court declared the statute uncon-
stitutional holding that a state may not impose a blanket pro-
vision requiring the consent of a parent as a condition for
abortion in the case of an unmarried minor.3 8 The Court
stated that "the State does not have the constitutional au-
thority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbi-
trary, veto" over the decision to terminate pregnancy.3 9 The
32. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1967).
33. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
34. Id. at 18-19.
35. See Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and
the State (pt. 3), 5 FAM. LAW Q. 63, 82 (1971) Kleinfeld asserts that the "meanings of
Due Process and Equal Protection for infants are changing rapidly in the direction of
greater conformity with [adult] standards." Id.
36. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
37. This provision is one among several challenged provisions. The others are
inapplicable to the issues under consideration. Id. at 58.
38. Id. at 74.
39. Id.
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decision was based, at least in part, on the rejection of paren-
tal authority as paramount to a child's constitutional rights,
and a realization that parental veto power is not likely to en-
hance parental authority or strengthen family unity. The
Court's argument is based on the fact that when a minor and
nonconsenting parent are fundamentally in conflict, and when
the family structure is already fractured, statutory goals are
not likely to be met.40
The final analysis in Danforth makes it clear that any in-
dependent interest a parent may have in such cases is no
more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent mi-
nor mature enough to have become pregnant.4 1 The court con-
cluded that third-party involvement must be sufficiently justi-
fied before it may be imposed.42 Bellotti v. Baird,5 the most
recent Supreme Court decision to consider the minor's right
to make an independent abortion decision, emphasized that a
state is required to act with particular sensitivity when it leg-
islates to foster parental involvement in constitutionally pro-
tected matters.44 Bellotti distinguished the minor's abortion
decision from the minor's decision to marry, asserting that a
minor not permitted to marry before the age of majority is
merely required to postpone the decision, while a pregnant
40. The Court examined the state interest in conditioning an abortion on the
consent of a parent or person in loco parentis, and concluded that providing a parent
with absolute power to overrule a determination made by a physician and his minor
patient is not likely to strengthen the family unit. Nor is it likely to enhance parental
authority where the minor and nonconsenting parent are fundamentally in conflict.
Id. at 75.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
44. Id. at 642. Bellotti stresses that there is "an important state interest in en-
couraging a family rather than a judicial resolution of a minor's abortion decision."
Id. at 648. This state interest, however, was not found sufficiently compelling so as to
preclude the minor's ability to make her abortion decision without parental involve-
ment. The Court concluded that "if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to
obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it must also provide an alternative
procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained." Id. at 643. This
requires a court to authorize the decision of a minor who is found to be mature and
adequately informed to make an intelligent decision regarding abortion. Id. at 646-50.
Although Bellotti attributes the need for particularly sensitive review to "the
unique nature of the abortion decision," Id. at 642, this should not be viewed as limit-
ing the Court's holding to abortion questions. In light of the similar protection af-
forded to minors in decisions concerning contraceptives, see infra notes 46-50 and
accompanying text, it is reasonable to apply the considerations articulated in Bellotti
to the minor's decision regarding marriage.
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adolescent "cannot preserve for long the possibility of abort-
ing."'4 5 This distinction loses impact, however, in cases where
the minor has already married. A court which concludes that
a voidable marriage has never existed bases its conclusion on
a fiction. While a marriage may be considered in theory as
never having existed, in reality this is not possible. Once a
marriage has taken place, postponement is not the issue. The
issue becomes a determination of whether each incident and
effect which has resulted from the union will be recognized or
denied. A determination so crucial must afford the spouses, at
the very least, an opportunity to prove that they will not ben-
efit from parental intervention or the imposition of parental
demands.
Constitutional protection has not been limited to a mi-
nor's right of privacy in making an abortion decision. A year
after Danforth, the Supreme Court, in Carey v. Population
Services International4 6 considered the constitutionality of a
law which made it a crime to distribute contraceptives to a
minor. The Court held that the right of privacy in connection
with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well
as adults.4 7 "State restrictions inhibiting the privacy rights of
minors are valid only if they serve 'any significant state inter-
est . . . that is not present in the case of an adult.' '" Since
blanket requirements of parental consent are not acceptable
in the case of abortion, Carey concluded that blanket prohibi-
tions regarding distribution of contraceptives are "a fortiori
foreclosed. ' '49
It follows then, that limitations on the rights of minors in
the area of fundamental privacy require close scrutiny and
clearly articulated justifications, and it is not unreasonable to
extend the analysis of Bellotti and Carey to the minor who
has successfully contracted a marriage. As indicated in Dan-
forth, family unity and parental authority will not likely be
found sufficiently compelling in cases where the family struc-
45. 433 U.S. at 642.
46. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The law under consideration was N.Y. EDUC. LAW }
6811(8) (McKinney 1972).
47. 431 U.S. at 693. The decision in Carey was based on the "right of personal
privacy [which] includes 'the interest in independence in making certain kinds of im-
portant decisions.'" Id. at 684 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
48. 431 U.S. at 693 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75).
49. Id. at 694.
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ture has already been fractured,"0 a circumstance inherent in
the minor's decision to marry and leave home contrary to pa-
rental demands.
III. CAPACITY AND THE ATTAINMENT OF EIGHTEEN YEARS
A. Marriageable Age
In California one achieves the capacity to make accept-
able marital decisions at the age of eighteen." This has not
always been the rule. Until 1921 a female of fifteen years was
capable of consenting to and consummating marrige without
regard to parental consent.52 Under present law, the mature
seventeen year old is not recognized, nor is the immature
nineteen year old. In light of the constitutional dimensions of
marital rights, such a blanket restriction is unacceptable.
The age of majority has never been rigidly fixed.
Throughout history there have been tremendous variations at-
tributed to climatic conditions,58 religious belief, and social
policy." At common law, if the parties themselves were of
proper age, no other consent was necessary to a binding mari-
tal agreement.55 Under this scheme, the marriage of a person
under the age of seven years was a nullity. Marriages con-
tracted by persons over the age of seven but under the age of
consent" were considered imperfect, and simply required af-
firmance by the party under disability upon reaching the age
of consent.57
50. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
51. CAL. CIv. CODE §4101 (West Supp. 1980). See supra note 40.
52. See CAL CIv. CODE § 56 (Deering 1915); 1921 Cal. Stat. Ch. 233 (amending §
56 by raising age of consent to 18 for females and 21 for males). See also In re Guard-
ianship of Ambrose, 170 Cal. 160, 149 P. 43 (1915) dismissing as moot, parents' ap-
peal from appointment of guardian for their 14 year old daughter because she had
attained the statutory age of consent and had so consented.
53. Climatic conditons are recognized as affecting the onset of puberty.
Throughout the ages, the attainment of puberty has been extremely influential in
making the child-adult delineation, even in legal terms. See Note, Some Phases of
the Law of Marriage, 30 HARv. L. REv. 124, 131-32 (1916-17).
54. Id. at 130-40; see generally Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among In-
fants, Their Parents and the State (pt. 2), 4 Fain. L. Q. 409, 412 (1970).
55. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 437, Annot., 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1202, 1206
(1909).
56. Under common law, the age of consent for males was attained at age 14,
females at age 12. 1 B. ARMSTRONG, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAw 44 (1953).
57. Annot., 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1202, 1202-03 (1909).
[Vol. 22
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Historically, there has been a fairly wide gap between the
age at which a minor was considered "of marriageable age"
and the age at which a minor could marry without parental
consent. One commentator has correlated an historical-geo-
graphical synopsis of what has been considered "marriageable
age."' 8 The survey leads to several conclusions: (1) the age at
which a minor has been considered capable of consenting to
marriage has never been fixed at age eighteen; (2) social policy
and religious beliefs have had tremendous impact on defining
the age at which a child may marry; (3) protection of the
young is not necessarily a determinative factor; and (4) paren-
tal control predominates as a consideration in the marital de-
cisions of their children.
Marriage at an early age has been considered an impera-
tive duty in societies where afterlife is dependent upon the
number of children one has borne. 9 In Japan, early marriage
has been considered an obligation to the state, 0 and in the
Algerian Arab society a child could be given away in marriage
before reaching the age of puberty. 1 Under Roman law, a per-
son could marry upon attaining the age of puberty, which was
determined as a matter of fact in each individual case. Follow-
ing the Roman law, Justinian fixed the ages, allowing males to
marry at fourteen years of age, females at the age of twelve.2'
These ages were adopted by the Council of Trent where it was
noted that early marriages would be helpful in "overcoming
the temptations of riotous youth" and would also increase the
number of the faithful.63
A more modern survey reveals that, while persons have
been considered "marriageable" anywhere from the age of
fourteen to the age of twenty-one, parental consent is com-
pletely unrelated to marital capacity. 4
58. See supra note 53, at 124.
59. In the Far East, considerations of the after-life demanded that parents
cause their children to wed early. It was believed that only through children could
one escape eternal torment or aimless wandering after death. Id. at 124-25.
60. "The Japanese ... encouraged early marriages more as a duty to the State
than for religious reasons .... " Id. at 126.
61. Id. at 127.
62. Id. at 129.
63. Id. at 130.
64. In the early 1900's a male in Denmark could marry at the age of 20, a fe-
male at 16. Parental consent was required until they reached 25. In Austria, both
male and female could marry at the age of 14, while parental consent was necesary
until the parties reached 24. Perhaps the most striking deviation between marriages-
1982]
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B. Capacity to Consent
The doctrine of "capacity to consent" originated as a pro-
tective device. It emerged from the view that minors were not
possessed of sufficient discretion to justify holding them liable
on their contracts or other obligations. The law assumed that
minors would fall victim to the wiles of designing adults who
would attempt to take advantage of their inexperience. Thus,
it was held that an adult who dealt with a minor would be
held to the agreement, while the minor could "disaffirm"
within a reasonable time after reaching majority."
From this role, one might conclude that the California
statute giving parents a right of action with regard to their
children's marriages is the result of a legislative effort to pro-
tect minors; however, such a conclusion is not possible. Nul-
lity proceedings are to be brought on the minor's behalf,66 not
at the minor's request. This presupposes three considerations
regarding a minor's ability to choose for himself or herself:
"[First,] liberty implies a process of making choices for one's
self; [second,] a child cannot comprehend most of the deci-
sions which he would have to make were he treated as an
adult; and [finally, the child cannot,] because of incapacity to
perform the activities of liberty, enjoy liberty in more than
name.
, , 7
At some point, however, the justification for withholding
decision-making power fails. When a child reaches a certain
maturity, the above considerations do not adequately re-
present his or her capabilities. Maturity is not a fixed concept,
a magical transformation occurring at age eighteen. According
to scientific research," persons attain adult capacity for logi-
cal thought at adolescence. Adult levels of performance on in-
ble age and parental consent requirements existed in France where males could marry
at 18, females at 15, yet parents could withhold consent until their children reached
30 years of age.
State policy has been a controlling factor in a Russian child's decision to marry.
In recent times, the Soviet Union has encouraged children to act independently of
their parents in order to strengthen the child's attachment to the state. In the early
20th century, however, a child who married without parental consent at any age was
subject to an eight month prison sentence. Id. at 130-39; see also Kleinfeld, supra
note 54, at 412.
65. ARMSTRONG, supra note 56, at 49.
66. Greene v. Williams, 9 Cal. App. 3d 559, 563, 88 Cal. Rptr. 261, 264 (1970).
67. Kleinfeld, supra note 35, at 69.
68. See id. at 69 n.29, for a discussion of research on cognitive development.
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telligence tests occur at about age thirteen, and an infant's
judgment about attribution of moral responsibility resembles
that of adults by the age of twelve or thirteen."" In short,
"persons generally reach their adult levels of abstract intelli-
gence and moral development long before the legal termina-
tion of infancy .... ,,"
In certain legal contexts, a minor's ability to make deci-
sions concerning his or her welfare has been accorded consid-
erable respect. In many states, children over fourteen are
given the right to choose a guardian. 7' Many states require the
written consent of a child over twelve before an adoption may
take place.72 And in determining parental custody, the choice
of a child over the age of fourteen is extremely influential.73
Such recognition rests on an implicit proposition that persons
over twelve or so have sufficient judgment to make wise deci-
sions about their own custody.'4
The capacity question has not been limited to persons
under the age of eighteen. Those with mental disabilities are
also deemed "incompetent to make marital decisions,"' ' 7 and
marriages successfully consummated by such persons are like-
wise subject to nullification proceedings brought by third
parties./
Much criticism has been leveled at laws which restrict the
civil and personal rights of the mentally disabled.' 7 Commen-
69. Id.
70. Id. at 69.
71. See Kleinfeld, supra note 54, at 441-42.
72. Id. at 442.
73. Id. at 441.
74. Id. at 442.
75. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4425(c) (West 1979) provides that a marriage is voidable
and may be adjudged a nullity if, at the time of the marriage, "[ejither party was of
unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife." For a discussion of the considerations involved when
mentally defective persons marry see Wald, The Legal Rights of People with Mental
Disabilities in the Community: A Plea for Laissez Faire; 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 1033, 1044-47 (1973).
76. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4426(c) (West 1980) provides that:
A proceeding to obtain a judgment of nullity of marriage, for causes set
forth in Section 4425, must be commenced within the periods and by
the parties as follows: . . .For causes mentioned in subdivision (c): by
the party injured, or relative or conservator of the party of unsound
mind, at any time before the death of either party.
77. See ALLEN, FERSTER & WIEHOFFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOM-
PETENCY (1968); AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
(rev. ed. Brakel & Rock 1971) [hereinafter cited as Brakel]; Dowben, Legal Rights of
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tators note that the varying degrees and characteristics in-
volved in mental incapacity have simply not been recognized
when marital abilities are questioned. a
Cases have frequently asserted that incapacity to enter
the marital relationship exists whenever there is such mental
incapacity as to disable one from entering into contracts gen-
erally.79 Such reasoning simply does not recognize the distinc-
tion between contracts and strictly personal affairs. One case
has aptly noted that marriage depends to a great extent on
sentiment, attachment, and affections which persons with
weak as well as those with strong intellects feel, and that such
attachments do not depend, to the extent that ordinary con-
tracts do, on the exercise of clear reason, discernment, and
sound judgment.80
When fundamental rights are involved, those who have
considered the problem insist that persons must be considered
in light of individual capacities.8 " "Every human being should
be presumed to have the rights [deemed fundamental] unless
someone can show an almost certain probability of disastrous
consequences if he is left free to exercise them."82
In any case where a person other than a party to the mar-
riage wishes to have a voidable marriage nullified, the very
least required is an individualized determination based on
whether this particular individual, in light of the strong pre-
sumption in his or her favor, is able to sustain a marital rela-
tionship, regardless of whether he or she is mentally deficient
or under eighteen years of age. Any other method of proceed-
ing cannot be justified as a protective measure. Concluding
that "protection" cannot be legitimately upheld as a legisla-
tive goal, the parental nullification power must be justified on
other grounds.
the Mentally Impaired, 16 Hous. L. REv. 833, 837 (1979); Wald, supra note 75, at
1033.
78. ALLEN, supra note 77, at 300-03; Brakel, supra note 77, at 226-27.
79. See, e.g., Dunphy v. Dunphy, 161 Cal. 380, 383, 119 P. 512, 513 (1911).
Though the degree of unsoundness requisite to a finding of nullity has never been
specifically defined, courts have frequently referred to ability to contract as offering
guidance to the court. 35 AM. JUR. Marriage § 18 (1941).
80. Svanda v. Svanda, 93 Neb. 404, 140 N.W. 777, 778 (1913); 47 L.R.A. (N.S.)
66.
81. See Dowben, supra note 77, at 880; Wald, supra note 75, at 1038-40.
82. Dowben, supra note 77, at 880 (citing Wald, supra note 75, at 1038).
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C. Other Justifications
1. Administrative Convenience
At the outset, administrative convenience as a basis for
setting statutory delineations has been rejected."3
2. The Onerous Nature of Nonage Marriages
California cases construing the prohibition against nonage
marriages have been interpreted as indicating that California
Civil Code Section 410181 does not express a strong state pol-
icy against nonage marriages.65 This conclusion is based pri-
marily upon the California Supreme Court's decision in Mc-
Donald v. McDonald" which held that even though the
parties involved were underage, residents of California, and
went to Nevada to marry with the express purpose of evading
California law, the marriage was valid and binding. Further
support for the position that nonage marriages are not oner-
ous per se lies in the fact that parents may consent to the
marriages of their nonaged children, and often do so.87
3. Parental Control
In light of the view that nonage marriages are not onerous
per se, the policies intended to be effecutated by the parental
nullification power are considered according to the cases ex-
83. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
84. See supra note 4.
85. Cases upholding the marriage of a nonaged spouse which takes place outside
the State of California and pursuant to the laws of the other jurisdiction authorize a
conclusion that there is no strong public policy in California against nonage mar-
riages. Note supra note 10, at 337-39.
86. 6 Cal. 2d 457, 459, 58 P.2d 163, 164 (1936). In McDonald, both spouses were
under the age of consent and had failed to obtain parental authorization. Although
parental consent was required in Nevada where the two were married, the Nevada
statute did not declare marriages in violation of the age restrictions as void. Mar-
riages which did take place, therefore, were conaiderd valid and binding. See Fitzpat-
rick v. Fitzpatrick, 6 Nev. 63 (1870).
The California Supreme Court considered the marriage binding as a result of
"the well-settled rule that a marriage which is contrary to the policies of the laws of
one state is yet valid therein if celebrated within and according to the laws of another
state." 6 Cal. 2d at 459, 58 P.2d at 164. The rule holds true only in cases where there
is no strong state policy against such marriages.
87. When parental consent is given, judicial authorization of the nonage mar-
riage is also required under CAL. CIV. CODE § 4101(b)(2). Unofficial statistics of the
Superior Court of Santa Clara County, California show permission is denied in fewer
than five percent of the cases considered.
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pressly addressing the issue." The one consistent justification
articulated or implied in these decisions is the fostering of pa-
rental control over children.8s This policy must therefore be
evaluated in terms of the careful scrutiny required by the fun-
damental rights cases.90
California cases have held that a parent has a separate
and distinct right of action to ask for and receive the remedy
of annulment of a child's marriage.' 1 This right has been char-
acterized as "somewhat in the nature of a property right," and
as paramount to the child's theoretical welfare and best inter-
ests." It is likely that this determination is simply the prod-
uct of the common law view which looked at guardianship and
parental power as profitable rights.'3 In a California Appellate
Court case, it was noted that California cases regard the child
somewhat in the nature of a chattel.
a. The Child as Chattel. Infants have always held a pe-
culiar status in society. Parental authority has generally been
accepted as extending to all areas of a child's life where there
is an explicit state interest sufficient to justify intervention."
Parental control over their children has been sanctioned in a
continuous line of United States Supreme Court decisions,9
88. See, e.g., Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d 636, 642, 334 P.2d 1011, 1015
(1959); Vaughan v. Gideon, 56 Cal. App. 2d 158, 132 P.2d 529 (1942). But see Greene
v. Williams, 9 Cal. App. 3d 559, 88 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1970). Greene expressly distin-
guishes Turner and Vaughan. See also Kleinfeld, supra note 54, at 410-13.
89. The cases indicate that statutes requiring parental consent for the issuance
of a marriage license are intended to permit a parent to exercise control and disci-
pline over his or her children. In Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d 636, 639, 334
P.2d 1011 (1959) the court held that the father of an 18 year old boy may have his
son's marriage annulled where his consent has been induced by the son's fraudulent
misrepresentations. The holding is based on former CAL. CIv. CODE § 82 (now § 4425)
which the court felt was "obviously" designed for the protection of parents. 167 Cal.
App. 2d at 643, 334 P.2d at 1015.
90. See note 13-49 and accompanying text for discussion of the constitutional
issues.
91. Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d 636, 643-44, 334 P.2d 1011, 1015-16
(1959); Vaughan v. Gideon, 56 Cal. App. 2d 158, 162, 132 P.2d 529, 531 (1942).
92. Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d 636, 642, 334 P.2d 1011, 1015 (1959).
93. See Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, their Parents and the
State (pt. 1), 4 FAM. L. Q. 319, 341 (1970) (noting 2 F. POLLACK AND F. MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW. (1898)).
94. Shea v. Shea, 100 Cal. App. 2d 60, 67, 223 P.2d 32, 36 (1950).
95. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944); Kleinfeld, supra
note 54, at 413-15.
96. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parent's right to deter-
mine a child's education); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (held
that "those who nurture [a child] and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
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and although these cases were decided in light of the parent-
state conflict, the child's interests were never represented.
Thus, parents and guardians may or may not have acted ac-
cording to the child's welfare and it is becoming increasingly
recognized that the child's best interests are not always pro-
tected. In cases where minor and parent are in conflict, the
assumption that parents act in their children's best interests
is not warranted. One observer notes that "U]udicial opinions
sometimes seem colored by a belief that parents because of
their natural love for their children and wisdom are constitu-
tionally incapable of abusing their power. . . ."97 Recent leg-
islation and case law have demonstrated that this belief is not
always borne out by facts.
In the area of juvenile justice, it has been recognized that
"[T]here maybe grounds for concern that the child receives
the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protection
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children."1 Within the scope of cus-
tody determinations, it is found that parents may desire cus-
tody of their children for reasons other than love and concern
for the child's welfare. The United States Supreme Court ex-
pressed this view in one opinion: "Unfortunately, experience
has shown that the question of custody, so vital to the child's
happiness and well-being, frequently cannot be left to the dis-
cretion of the parents." 99 It is urged that the utility of paren-
tal consent is especially doubtful in the context of marital de-
cisions in view of the fact that under present law, parents may
withhold consent for any reason unrelated to the best inter-
ests of their children. Parents may prevent or terminate a po-
tentially successful marriage, or they may permit an ill-fated
one. 100 Where the law strengthens parental power over minor
children, with little regard for the minor's legitimate interests,
the possibility for child-parent conflict is clear.101
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations"); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (forbidding teaching foreign language to a child below
the eighth grade level unreasonably interferes with parents and guardians right to
direct the upbringing and education of their children).
97. Kleinfeld, supra note 54, at 425.
98. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
99. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962).
100. Note, supra note 31, at 303.
101. See Kleinfeld, supra note 35, at 76 (disobedient and runaway child stat-
utes considered).
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b. Child No Longer Viewed as a Chattel. The view of
children as the property of their parents is being steadily
eroded. 10 2 Judicial emphasis is rapidly shifting from the
supremacy of parental control to the best interests of the
child.'03 A prime example may be found in the child abuse
laws. During the 19th century, legal restraints on parental
cruelty were nonexistent; presently, virtually every state has
enacted statutes requiring physicians to report suspected
child abuse.' 04 Another example may be found in the area of
tort law. Whereas parents have traditionally been immune
from a tort action brought by their children, this is no longer
true. 05
Parents no longer have total authority over the medical
treatment their children receive. The state now has the au-
thority to order certain types of medical treatment over pa-
rental objection, including a limited authority to act where the
child's life is not immediately threatened. 1°6 Minors them-
selves in certain circumstances may obtain medical treatment
without consulting their parents. 10 7 In the context of delin-
quency proceedings, a minor may no longer be denied due
process rights. 0 8 Several jurisdictions require that children in-
volved in custody proceedings be made a party to the action
102. See, e.g., In re Eugene W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629, 105 Cal. Rptr. 736, 740
(1972). Eugene indicates that:
contrary to the previous feudalistic view which claimed a parental prop-
erty right in the child [citation omitted], the modern trend of cases and
authority places a growing emphasis on the paramount interest of the
child . . . . [T]he dominant parent-right doctrine should be replaced by
a broadened, best-interest-of-the-child test, so that the court's inquiry
will focus on the needs of the child rather than the rights of their
parents.
Id.
103. Id. See also, Note, Persons-Parent and Child-Custody of Children, 19 S.
CAL. L. REV. 72, 72-73 (1945).
104. Kleinfeld, supra note 54, at 428-31. See, e.g., CAL. WELF, & INST. CODE §§
18950-61 (West 1980).
105. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288,
(1971); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
106. See, e.g., Citizens' Parental Rights v. San Mateo Board of Education, 51
Cal. App. 3d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975) (state may require vaccinations against dis-
ease (citing Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1904)).
107. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 25.6, 34.5, 34.6 (West 1980). See also Ballard v. Ander-
son, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971); Note, Medical Care and the
Independent Minor, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 334 (1970).
108. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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and be provided with legal representation.10 9 Perhaps the
greatest recognition of the untenable position that some mi-
nors are placed in may be found in the enactment of the
Emancipation of Minors Act.'10 Under the emancipation stat-
utes the court must sustain a minor's petition for emancipa-
tion if it finds that the required allegations in the petition are
true and that emancipation would not be contrary to the mi-
nor's best interests."'
In view of the expanding recognition of the rights of mi-
nors within the legal system, a law giving a third person arbi-
trary control over the minor's marital decisions is anomalous.
Add to this the danger of exposing such persons to the caprice
or selfishness of the designated "protectors" and the conclu-
sion is that a minor's right to protection includes the right to
be protected from the improper and arbitrary decisions of
others.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE
A marriage characterized as voidable by the Family Law
Act is valid until a judicial declaration of nullity takes
place." 2 A right of action to dissolve the marriage for some
cause existing at the time it took place has no effect on the
109. Kleinfeld, supra note 93, at 337.
110. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 60-68 (West Supp. 1980). This Act enables a minor who
is emancipated in fact to make binding contracts, to lease an apartment, to sue and
be sued, to live apart from parents, and generally be treated as an adult. The purpose
of the statute is not to emancipate minors who would not otherwise be emancipated;
it is intended, rather, to allow a minor who is de facto emancipated to obtain a judi-
cial declaration of the fact in order that he or she may function as an adult.
111. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 60-68 (West Supp. 1980). The court must declare the
minor emancipated if:
(1) Petitioner is at least 14 years of age.
(2) Petitioner willingly lives separate and apart from his or her
parents with their consent.
(3) Petitioner is managing his or her own financial affairs.
(4) The source of Petitioner's income is not derived from any ac-
tivity declared to be a crime.
(5) Granting the petition is not contrary to the best interest of
petitioner.
If the minor's petition for a declaration of emancipation is denied, the minor may
seek review of the denial by filing a petition for a writ of mandate. If the petition is
sustained, the parent or guardian has the right to do the same if they have appeared
in the proceeding and opposed the granting of the petition. Id. at § 64(f), (e).
112. ARMSTRONG, supra note 56, at 49; 1 CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3.1211] (C. Markey ed. 1980).
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relationship until it is exercised.' In fact, there are limits
placed on the ability of a party to commence such proceed-
ings: If the rules are not observed, the right of action is for-
feited entirely." 4
The California Supreme Court has declared it to be the
public policy of the state to foster and protect marriage and to
prevent separation.10 In the absence of specific statutory au-
thority, the generally accepted rule is that only the spouse
under disability may commence an action to have the mar-
riage declared a nullity." " The standing of persons foreign to
the marriage is not specifically recognized under Title III and
California case law indicates that in dissolution proceedings
the parties alone have standing.' 17 As long as the parties to
the marriage desire to remain married, it is deemed to be in
the best interest of society that the relationship be sus-
tained." 8 A California Appellate Court, in Turner v. Tur-
ner," 9 however, has held that the policy against nonage mar-
riages is sufficient to overcome any public interest there may
be in upholding the validity of marriages, and that parents
have a separate and distinct right of action in commencing
and maintaining nullification proceedings.1s0
The idea that there is strong state policy against nonage
marriages has been challenged.' 2' In opposition to a finding
that public policy against nonage marriages overcomes any in-
terest in upholding'such marriages, it may be argued that
113. ARMSTRONG, supra note 56, at 42.
114. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4426(a) (West Supp. 1981) requires that an action
brought to nullify a voidable marriage as a result of nonage must be commenced by
the nonage spouse within four years of reaching majority by a parent, guardian, or
conservator at a time before the minor reaches the age of majority. If the marriage is
ratified (the spouses continue to cohabit after the nonaged spouse reaches majority)
the marriage cannot be challenged.
115. Glickman v. Collins, 13 Cal. 3d 852, 533 P.2d 204, 120 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1975);
Dribin v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d at 345, 231 P.2d 809 (1951).
116. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4500-31 (West 1970) (§§ 4500, 4502, 4504-05 repealed by
1970 Cal. Stats. ch. 311 §§ 2-5; now CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4350, 4351, 4355-56). See also
Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111, 28 S.E. 2d 40 (1943); In re Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41, 100
P. 159 (1909).
117. Note, supra note 10, at 346 (citing Cohen v. Cohen, 73 Cal. App. 2d 330,
166 P.2d 662 (1946)).
118. Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111, 28 S.E. 2d 40 (1943).
119. 167 Cal. App. 2d at 636, 334 P.2d 1011 (1959).
120. Id. at 643, 334 P.2d at 1015-16.
121. See supra notes 85-87.
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public policy is not static.1 2 In light of the constitutional ad-
vances in the interest of minors' rights123 and the erosion of
the idea that parental control is paramount to their childrens'
best interests, a re-evaluation of legislative purpose is
mandatory. The basis of the dicta in Turner may no longer be
valid.
"At marriage there is a change of status which affects [the
parties] and their posterity and the whole community. . . . It
is of such a nature that it cannot lightly be disregarded. 1 24
The considerations involved in a voidable marriage cannot re-
alistically be distinguished. "The difference between a man
and a woman affianced and their relation after marriage is
more than the difference between those [persons] who have
made an ordinary executory contract and the same persons
after the contract is executed." 2" For some persons, the
stigma of an annulment is less than that of a dissolved mar-
riage. 126 When the spouses themselves are not seeking the nul-
lification, however, for whom is the benefit really sought? A
minor who is spared the theoretical "stigma" of dissolution, is
required to suffer the very real termination of a relationship
that he or she wishes to continue.
The elimination of fault as an element of divorce in Cali-
fornia provides a significant change of circumstances calling
for a second look in terms of out-dated notions surrounding
dissolution. Prior to the enactment of the Family Law Act in
1970,127 a divorce in California would be granted only if one
spouse was found guilty of adultery, extreme cruelty, willful
desertions, willful neglect, habitual intemperance, or was con-
victed of a felony or found incurably insane. If the other
spouse were not free of guilt the divorce might be denied. The
system fostered a tremendous amount of bitterness, trauma,
and acrimony. 2 8 A parent might well hope to spare a child
122. See, e.g., Hall v. Baylous, 109 W.Va. 1, 153 S.E. 293 (1930). Hall held that:
"The public policy of to-day [sic] may not be the public policy of to-morrow [sic].
The notion as to what is injurious to the public welfare at one time may not accord
with the notion of a succeeding generation." Id. at 7, 153 S.E. 2d at 295.
123. See notes 13-49 supra and accompanying text.
124. Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 404, 406-07, 50 N.E. 933, 934 (1898).
125. Id. at 406, 50 N.E. at 934.
126. See Note, supra note 10, at 322, 336 (citing 4 CAL. ASSEM. JOURN. 8060
(1969)).
127. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1980).
128. See Hammer, Divorce Reform in California, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 32, 37
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from the cruelty of such a system. Under the present scheme,
however, dissolution is not only less painful, it is easier, faster
and carries less of the stigma formerly equated with di-
vorce. "'29 According to a report of the Governor's Commission
on the Family, the new dissolution proceeding was so much
like the annulment of voidable marriages that they recom-
mended the grounds be merged. e80
Although the legislature amended the Committee's rec-
ommendation to incorporate provisions for annulment,' 1 the
significance is in the blurring of distinctions between the new
dissolution proceedings and nullification proceedings. Some
very interesting propositions emerged from the proposals for
legislative reform. A proposal by Senator Donald Grunsky and
Assemblyman Winfield Shoemaker provided for a petition of
inquiry which could be filed in order to trigger certain coun-
seling services of the family court.8 2 In cases where the par-
ties do not desire counseling, the court, upon proof of the non-
capacity to consent, would dissolve the marriage. In cases
where the parties do desire counseling and do not wish the
dissolution to occur, presumably the marriage would not be
dissolved. In effect, the proposed Act would have permitted "a
minor who does not have the capacity to consent to marriage,
but who somehow contracts a marriage not void ab initio, to
remain married despite the will of his parents to the con-
trary."' 88 Such a system would allow the marriage to stand,
even though one or both parties was under the age of consent
(1968-69) Krom, California's Divorce Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, I PAc. L.
J. 156, 156-57 (1970) Note, supra note 10, at 331.
129. See Note, supra note 10, at 336.
130. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY at 35-36 (1966).
This recommendation provides in pertinent part:
[Tihe essential question presented in the annulment of a voidable mar-
riage does not differ from that presented in any dissolution of marriage
cases . . . [the Commission recommends] the elimination of specific
fault grounds and the coalescence of all dissolution proceedings (save for
declarations of nullity in case of void marriages) into a single form of
action governed by a single standard."
Id. (cited in Note, supra note 10, at 332).
131. The grounds for voidable marriage were retained, as it was noted that mar-
riages involving persons unable to consent would thus have to be declared either void
or valid for all purposes. It was feared that if such marriages were deemed totally
valid, the parties under disability could not even themselves disaffirm. Note, supra
note 10, at 338-39.
132. See Hammer, supra note 128, at n.5.
133. Id. at 69.
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in cases where the relationship of the parties has proved to be
sound, having endured the "counseling gauntlet".
134
Although such a system would foster problems of its own,
such as encouraging minors to procure marriage licenses
through fraudulent means or allowing some minors to act con-
trary to their best interests, " it seems that these difficulties
could be met simply but adding one further requirement-a
judicial determination that the marriage is in the minor's best
interest.
V. CONCLUSION
When children are to be treated differently from adults,
some philosophy must exist which justifies the different treat-
ment. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized
that departures from established principles of due process fre-
quently result in arbitrariness rather than in enlightened pro-
cedure. Thus, a law which provides a parent with the means
to invalidate a potentially viable marriage desired by both
spouses, must rest upon a legitimate legislative goal demand-
ing this special treatment. California provides parents with
the right to nullify a minor child's marriage. The right, how-
ever, is not supported by a legitimate legislative goal. An al-
ternative to the present system must be found. A simple dele-
tion of the parental power to bring nullification proceedings is
one alternative; however, such a solution would leave an im-
mature minor without protection beyond his or her own re-
sources. A more acceptable solution must recognize that not
every minor need be endowed with effective consent. It must
distinguish those minors who are capable of making a mature
decision from those who are not.
In Bellotti3 6 the Supreme Court held that if a state in-
tends to require parental consent to a minor's abortion, it
must provide the minor with an alternative procedure
134. Id. at 66-67.
135. It is noted that such a system would also provide little protection for
strong-willed children or children whose wills have been overborne and who have con-
tracted marriage against their best interests. There is a further concern in that such a
system might encourage minors to procure marriage licenses through fraudulent
means, knowing that the marriage could be sustained against parental objection. On
the other hand, it is also recognized that such a law would protect those underage
persons who have married and are expecting to or have borne children. Id.
136. 443 U.S. 622.
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whereby parental involvement may be bypassed. No less is re-
quired in the case of a minor who has married. Adoption of
the policy in Bellotti would protect not only the minor who
will be harmed by a premature marriage, but also the minor
who has made a marital decision which is clearly in his or her
best interest. The procedure would require a court to author-
ize the decision of a minor who is found to be mature and well
enough informed to make an intelligent decision regarding
marriage. In cases where the court is not satisfied that the mi-
nor is competent to make an independent marital decision,
the procedure would permit the minor to show that continua-
tion of the marriage would nevertheless be in his or her best
interest.1 37 It would be up to the nonaged spouse to convince
the court, according to a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard, that he or she possesses the requisite maturity or that
the marriage is justifed in light of the minor's best interests.3 8
Marriage is a status that "cannot lightly be disregarded" when
spouses themselves are not seeking nullification, only an indi-
vidualized determination of capability or best interests will
justify a court's imposition of the fiction that a marriage has
never existed.
137. Id. at 646-50.
138. Bellotti requires a court to permit a minor to terminate pregnancy without
parental consent if the court is unable to adduce sufficient evidence indicating that
the minor is not capable of making an independent abortion decision and that the
abortion is contrary to the minor's best interests. On the other hand, In re Phillip B.,
92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), recently determined that when parental
decisions concerning their minor children are to be overruled, the state must justify
the intervention according to a clear and convincing evidence standard. Phillip B.
offers the better guidance in this case because, while the legislature has recognized
the minor's right to an abortion, the minor's right to marry has not been unequivo-
cally accepted.
Parental decisions are preferred over judicial decisions. Therefore, if the courts
are to substitute their own judgment for that of a child's parents, it is reasonable to
require a showing that the intervention is justified.
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